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Exploiting Seams and Closing 
Gaps: Lessons from Mumbai and 
Beyond
Andrea Dew1
U.S. Naval War College, Newport, R.I.
Abstract
This article analyzes a single event—the 2008 Mumbai attacks—in order 
to consider the strategic and operational lessons for dealing with other 
armed groups. How and why was Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (LeT) able to carry 
out such a sophisticated attack in the heart of Mumbai? And what lessons 
does Mumbai hold for strategists seeking to counter other armed groups 
around the world? While tactical level lessons from Mumbai have been 
well documented, it is important to also consider what the Mumbai 
attacks tell us at the strategic and operational levels. Specifically, the 
Mumbai attacks provide valuable insight into how armed groups use the 
maritime environment, and how they use surprise, denial, and deception 
to mask intention and invite over-reaction by states. In addition, studying 
the Mumbai attacks provides insight into some of the strategic and opera-
tional seams and gaps that armed groups seek to exploit. These include 
environmental and geographical factors; institutional, bureaucratic, and 
jurisdictional seams and gaps between agencies; cognitive seams and gaps 
that made the use of the sea by LeT so difficult to conceptualize; and the 
diplomatic seams and gaps that led to heightened tensions among states—
in this case, India, Pakistan, and the United States. This article discusses 
how to categorize these seams and gaps in order to better address the 
problems they create, and how states might best direct and focus their 
limited resources when faced with similar challenges.
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Introduction
"The enemy must not know where I intend to give battle. For if he does 
not know…he must prepare in a great many places. And when he pre-
pares in a great many places, those I have to fight in any one place will 
be few."2
—Sun Tzu, Art of War
In a sustained and bloody attack from November 26–29, 2008, four 
teams of Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (LeT)—Army of the Righteous—gunmen 
attacked ten separate sites in the Indian coastal city of Mumbai. Among 
others, the Taj Mahal and Oberoi Trident hotels, the rail terminus, a 
women and children's hospital, a Jewish community center, a movie the-
ater, and the Leopold Café were all targeted. Indian police reported that 
ten men, nine of whom were killed, carried out the attacks. The gunmen 
arrived in the city via a hijacked Indian trawler (MV Kuber) and used 
small boats to reach the shore. At this point they hired taxis to drive them 
to the first attack sites and planted bombs in the taxis.3 The explosion 
from those bombs created further fog, friction, chaos, and uncertainty in 
the besieged city. The only attacker who was captured alive, a Pakistani 
citizen named Ajmal Kasab, admitted being part of the Pakistani-based 
LeT, which is designated a terrorist organization by the United States, 
United Kingdom, India, and Pakistan (among others).4 The sophisticated 
and carefully coordinated attack stunned Indian officials and the interna-
tional community. When it was over, 172 people had been killed and at 
least 300 were wounded.5
While tactical level lessons from Mumbai have been well documented, it 
is important to also consider what the Mumbai attacks tell us at the stra-
tegic and operational levels.6 This article analyzes a single event—the 
2008 Mumbai attacks—in order to consider the strategic and operational 
lessons for dealing with other armed groups. Using a single case study to 
draw such lessons is not without its limitations; however, the argument in 
this article is that even a single event can provide us with valuable insights 
if we use it to evaluate how armed groups exploit seams and gaps to their 
advantage.
One of the challenges of using a single case from which to draw lessons is 
that many variables in the Mumbai attack could be considered so 
unique—sui generis—that generalizable lessons cannot be discerned. 
These unique factors include the specific sites targeted, the weapons used, 
the police response in Mumbai, and even the geography of Mumbai itself. 
In addition, without multiple data sets, it is difficult to test and falsify 
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hypotheses and to determine whether the four seams and gaps identified 
above are exhaustive, whether they should be prioritized, and whether 
more should be considered. One might also argue that the challenges of 
preventing or successfully disrupting another Mumbai-style attack are 
either too great or too specific to the armed group involved to provide 
generalizable discussion on how to minimize threats from any armed 
groups. Given India's finite resources for security in one city, Mumbai's 
coast line, and the determination of the LeT to attack targets in India, it 
could also be argued that it is simply too difficult to close seams and gaps, 
regardless of the lessons from Mumbai.
These are all valid points. However, the argument in this article is that the 
2008 Mumbai attacks are a valuable and rich case study for analysis for 
three reasons: the armed group's strategic maturity and strategic evolu-
tion; the way the armed group used the maritime environment to its 
advantage; and the way this armed group exploited strategic and opera-
tional seams and gaps in Indian security forces and between states. These 
are discussed in more detail in sections two and three, following a brief 
section on methodology. Moreover, although the list of seams and gaps 
may not be exhaustive, a brief discussion of other armed groups in the 
conclusion helps to broaden the applicability of these lessons.
Finally, in considering current and future irregular challenges, the 
purpose of this article is to consider how to minimize the threats and 
maximize the opportunities to counter armed groups. India is not alone in 
having finite resources to address security challenges. Nor is it alone in 
facing a determined armed group that is willing to innovate, and in having 
geography that makes it inviting for armed groups to target certain cities 
or areas. From the trans-Sahel states in Africa, to the archipelago states in 
Southeast Asia, to the states of Latin America, many countries face the 
same challenge from armed groups. The argument in this article is that 
the Mumbai attacks provide a useful case to consider how states might 
best direct and focus their limited resources when faced with similar 
challenges. Thus, despite the limitations of a single case study, it is still 
important to begin the process of identifying the types of seams and gaps 
that armed groups have taken advantage of in order to provide a stepping-
off point for further discussion on how to incorporate these strategic and 
operational lessons into current and future security planning and 
coordination.
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Exploiting the Maritime Environment
As the opening quote illustrates, the strategist Sun Tzu warns his readers 
not to strike at the place where their adversaries are strongest, but to look 
instead for where they are vulnerable.7 Attack their strategies, undermine 
their alliances, and seek them out where they are least able to respond, he 
advises.8 LeT certainly seems to have taken a leaf from Sun Tzu's book in 
the planning and execution of the Mumbai attacks.9 Indeed, the 2008 
attacks are a prime example of how armed groups use complex environ-
ments to attack where a state is least prepared to respond. Of particular 
importance in this assessment are the evolution of LeT's strategies and 
the use of the maritime environment by this otherwise land-locked armed 
group to attack a coastal city. How and why was LeT able to carry out such 
a sophisticated attack in the heart of Mumbai? And what lessons does 
Mumbai hold for strategists seeking to counter other armed groups 
around the world?
LeT was founded in 1990 as the militant wing of Markaz Daway ul 
Irshad (MDI)—Center for Religious Learning and Propagation.10 The 
MDI organization, which has its headquarters in Muridke, near Lahore, 
Pakistan, uses the combination of its educational programs and LeT's mil-
itant activities to develop a jihadi culture. LeT "was meant to equip the 
adherents for practical experience in waging jihad."11 According to former 
Pakistani policeman turned scholar Hassan Abbas, LeT "prides itself on 
introducing suicide bombings into the Kashmir theater" and carries out 
attacks in disputed Kashmir territories.12 In June 1999, one of LeT's three 
founding leaders, Hafiz Saeed, declared "that LeT was not working for the 
liberation of Kashmir alone, but intended to aid the 200 million Muslims 
in India."13
The expansion of LeT ambitions to include India made Mumbai a particu-
larly attractive, symbolic target.14 Mumbai is a vibrant city that houses 
historical and modern economic, entertainment, cultural, and political 
focal points. Home to more than twenty million people, it is the fourth-
largest city in the world.15 Mumbai also presents the perfect strategic 
communications opportunity for violent groups who wish to draw atten-
tion to their actions and instill a sense of fear. As noted above, the four 
teams of LeT gunmen that held Mumbai hostage for three days in Novem-
ber 2008 attacked ten separate places throughout the city, giving ample 
time and space for media coverage. The Mumbai attackers used focal 
points—widely recognized buildings—that were selected to catch public 
attention and create a sense of urgency and panic. Moreover, by targeting 
landmark buildings where large numbers gather such as the Taj Mahal 
and Oberoi Trident hotels and the rail terminus, the sheer number of peo-
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ple involved captivated public attention. This combination of public 
attention and urgency created further seams and gaps as the attack 
unfolded, placing pressure on the authorities in Mumbai and the Indian 
government in New Delhi to act quickly with little time for planning and 
coordination. This further invited errors in judgment—strategic and tacti-
cal—and the potential for state over-reaction, which created further con-
fusion and fear.16 Finally, the presence of India's Bollywood film studios 
assured regional and international media coverage of the events and their 
aftermath.17
Several excellent reports have detailed the tactical and operational issues 
that made it possible for the 2008 attack to take place and the problems 
Indian security forces faced in ending the sieges.18 For example, the death 
of the deputy chief of police at Mumbai's central railway station, where 
the first attack took place, quickly created a command vacuum. Moreover, 
the attackers were more heavily armed than the police officers at the rail-
way station, and their AK-47s were able to completely penetrate the bul-
letproof vests of the first responders. As a result, and due to the multiple 
attack sites, crisis response protocols inside the city were never com-
pletely executed, which allowed the LeT teams to move between locations 
with impunity. In particular, after the first attack at Mumbai's railway sta-
tion, the gunmen were able to escape and move on to their next target 
even as security forces were attempting to respond to the first attack.19 By 
attacking in several places around Mumbai, moving between attack sites, 
and planting bombs in taxis, the gunmen were able to dictate the tempo of 
the attacks, keep the media focused on events, and sow confusion 
amongst police teams.
Getting to Mumbai
As noted above, LeT is widely considered to have training camps inside 
Pakistan and Kashmir; thus, in order to plan and carry out the attacks, 
they had to solve the issue of how to reach Mumbai. Solving this problem 
required both creativity and ingenuity. Mumbai's train system, against 
which LeT led an attack on July 11, 2006 resulting in more than 200 
deaths and 700 people injured, meant increased but not perfect security 
on the rail system. The most obvious and overland routes into India are 
both risky and predictable. A truck loaded with explosives making the 
long drive into the city would stand a high chance of being stopped and 
searched. The LeT reconnaissance team sent to Mumbai prior to the 
attacks noted, however, that the boat ride across the bay from the airport 
not only provided an excellent view of the city but also exposed how vul-
nerable Mumbai's coastline was to a maritime approach.20
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In order to focus the attention of the world on LeT and its agenda, the 
group had to solve some perplexing operational and strategic challenges; 
for example, how to use the environment, including Mumbai's waterways, 
to their advantage to achieve freedom of movement and surprise. This 
was no simple feat as India has a coast guard and navy to ensure that 
domination of the waves near its shore remained under its control. With a 
few exceptions, this coverage is sufficient to guard against the usual mari-
time suspects, incursions by other states and criminal activities by pirates 
and smugglers.21
So, why did LeT attack Mumbai via the sea? How was it able to overcome 
the technical and logistical difficulties? What issues does this raise for 
consideration of how other armed groups use their environment to their 
advantage? First, by arriving via sea, LeT had more options to follow Sun 
Tzu's strategic advice, disguise their intentions and conceal their 
approach. Even though state-owned navies rule the oceans, their coverage 
is far from universal. Moreover, although interdicting access routes or 
supply lines is a difficult task whether on land or at sea, it is particularly 
tricky at sea. Mumbai is a very busy harbor surrounded by an even busier 
waterway. In this case, LeT was counting on the ocean to maintain strate-
gic, operational, and tactical surprise. Their exploitation of the maritime 
environment was exceptionally imaginative and rested on their pre-attack 
reconnaissance of security features in Mumbai and the advantage that 
arriving by sea brought to the gunmen.22 In essence, they were banking 
on getting lost in the vast open expanses of the ocean while at sea, and 
then getting lost in the crowded commons near the shore.
Second, LeT treated the maritime environment as a line of 
communication rather than attempting to establish sea control. Although 
LeT had not used the maritime environment for attacks, the group was no 
stranger to using the ocean as a conduit for moving goods, people, 
supplies, and weapons across the Indian Ocean. They were able to move 
swiftly without developing an extensive maritime skill set of their own by 
using the sea around Mumbai as a conduit to move gunmen and supplies 
rather than a base from which to conduct an attack. They were also able to 
minimize the equipment and logistics required to carry out the attack. By 
hijacking an Indian trawler (MV Kuber) while it was still outside of Indian 
waters and killing the crew, LeT was able to use the ship's captain to drive 
the vessel into coastal waters undetected.23 Moreover, as discussed in 
more detail below, interoperability issues and confusion over maritime 
areas of responsibility among the Indian Navy, Coast Guard, and coastal 
police forces made it possible for the four teams to slip into the city 
unchallenged.24
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While this was an innovative way for LeT to use the maritime environ-
ment, other groups like the Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka have led the way in 
using the oceans as conduits for moving supplies and even amphibious 
landings. For example, the Tamil "Sea Tigers" developed into a 3,000-
strong force that carried out suicide attacks at sea, smuggled weapons and 
supplies across the Polk Straight between Sri Lanka and India, and ferried 
weapons from warehouse "mother ships" deep in the Indian Ocean.25 
Certainly, this is an extreme example of what a well-funded armed group 
is capable of.26 However, both the Tamil Tigers and LeT's use of the mari-
time environment serve as reminders that armed groups can use the 
oceans and littorals to their advantage—and that states overlook these 
strategic capabilities to their peril.
In summary, this section discussed how LeT specifically used the mari-
time environment to its advantage and how it took advantage of other 
strategic and operational seams. This brief survey of the 2008 Mumbai 
attacks reveals some of the strategies that LeT used to their advantage. 
These included:
•   The use of surprise, denial, and deception to mask their approach and 
cause confusion during the attacks;
•   The use of the maritime environment to create strategic and opera-
tional freedom of movement;
•   Creating strategic communications seams and gaps by inviting over-
reaction and dictating timing and operational tempo.
Exploiting Seams and Closing Gaps
In addition to providing us with an opportunity to think about how armed 
groups use their environment to their advantage, the Mumbai attacks are 
a reminder of how armed groups exploit seams and gaps in security cover-
age. It is common practice for states to draw lines separating operational, 
jurisdictional, and territorial lines of authority that flow from land to litto-
rals, to sea, to land across international boundaries. Although the intent is 
to make distinct boundaries between different areas of authority, these 
lines often create seams that a host of actors exploit. This section dis-
cusses these seams and gaps more generally and argues that armed 
groups are particularly adept at exploiting four key seams and gaps: The 
environmental and geographical factors discussed previously; the institu-
tional, bureaucratic, and jurisdictional seams and gaps between agencies; 
the cognitive seams and gaps that made the use of the sea by armed 
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groups difficult to conceptualize; and the diplomatic seams and gaps that 
led to heightened tensions among India, Pakistan, and the United States.
The Mumbai attacks exposed the institutional seams among the Indian 
Navy, Coast Guard, and Coastal Police. There was a tangible seam in 
terms of areas of responsibility, as well as seams in communication, infor-
mation sharing, and interoperability. As a result, security around Mumbai 
was split between an outer layer (deep sea) that was given to the Indian 
Navy, and an inner layer (littorals and close to ports and beaches) that 
was the responsibility of the Coast Guard. These artificial lines and con-
fused authorities created numerous blind spots that LeT took advantage 
of. Indeed, the hijacked trawler, the MV Kuber, was able to pass through 
the Indian Navy's jurisdiction and into the Coast Guard's jurisdiction 
without being stopped.27
Looking back at the attacks with 20/20 hindsight, it certainly seems that 
the maritime approach offered a potential point of failure for LeT, and 
was probably the last best point at which the attacks could have been pre-
vented. This raises the question of what the Indian security agencies—and 
other states with similar challenges—could have done to close these seams 
and gaps, given the busy waterway and finite resources. For starters, prac-
tical skills sets and habits of cooperation are developed by training 
together, but the Indian Navy had discontinued joint coastal patrolling off 
the Mumbai coast after September 2005, and by 2008 neither the Navy 
nor the Coast Guard had practiced working together in joint operations. 
As a result, there was little understanding of the limits of their joint capa-
bilities and coverage and the blind spots that standard operating proce-
dures created. This lack of practical experience in working together was 
complicated by an inability to share intelligence or even best practices.28 
Coupled with confused jurisdictions, this created a seamed environment 
in which there was no easy method to coordinate information or to act on 
information if it were coordinated.29
Of course, this issue of confused jurisdictions and seams between areas of 
responsibilities, as well as lack of interoperability and cooperation is cer-
tainly not limited to the Indian security forces and the Mumbai attacks. 
The 9/11 Commission Report, for example, argues that all of these factors, 
and others, contributed to the seams that the 9/11 hijackers exploited in 
the attacks against the United States on September 2001.30 Moreover, 
developing habits of cooperation, interoperability, and intelligence shar-
ing, and working through legal and national limitations continue to chal-
lenge defense and security professionals in the United States, despite the 
creation of an overarching bureaucracy—the Department of Homeland 
Security—to coordinate efforts among the agencies responsible for 
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domestic security.31 Competing interests, budgetary issues, institutional 
culture, bureaucratic inertia, standard operation procedures, and training 
schedules compound these difficulties at the strategic level. Additionally, 
as the cross-Strait activities of al-Qaida in Yemen and Somalia have dem-
onstrated, even the divisions of geographic areas among military areas of 
responsibilities—such as Combatant Commands and Task Forces—create 
seams and gaps in coverage and coordination that armed groups 
exploit.32 
Second, this case draws our attention to cognitive seams and gaps, the 
factors that the 9/11 Commission Report called "failures in imagina-
tion."33 In this case, the cognitive seam—the failure in imagination—was 
the use of the maritime environment as a conduit for an attack.
Although command of the high seas may belong to the world's state 
navies, armed groups use the world's waterways—oceans, littorals, rivers, 
and swamps—as conduits for flows of people, goods, drugs, weapons, and 
money. The Mediterranean and the vast Indian Ocean region, which 
extends from the south and east African coasts across to the Indonesian 
and Philippine archipelagos, is awash with tankers, freighters, and tiny 
dhows that flow undetected and unchallenged across the world's oceans. 
Armed groups are used to operating clandestinely, and since they don't 
typically need to develop dockyards and training academies, they can be 
very creative at hiding their vessels and operational preparation. For 
example, some armed groups such as the Tamil Tigers and narco-
traffickers in Colombia have developed their own indigenous maritime 
capabilities of converting seemingly innocuous vessels into suicide-attack 
craft, in addition to submersibles, fast attack boats, and even warehouse 
mother ships to resupply weapons.34
However, as the Mumbai attacks demonstrate, states continue to be 
surprised by the innovative use of the maritime domain by armed groups. 
One reason is that states mainly focus their intelligence assessments on 
other states. In the twenty-first century, the development and exertion of 
naval power includes the ability to disrupt the free flow of goods and oil 
on which the global economy depends. Iran's 2012 threats to close off the 
Straits of Hormuzin response to the threat of EU oil sanctions are a good 
example of this; in response, the United States, Britain, and France sent 
an aircraft carrier and six warships to pass through the Straits.35 In 
comparison to the complex regional and international security issues that 
surround the development of Chinese or Iranian naval capabilities, it is 
understandable that the use of the oceans by armed groups can be 
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overlooked. The strategic repercussions of the Mumbai attacks on Indo-
Pakistani relations, however, demonstrate the costs of continuing to 
overlook armed groups at sea.
States ignore the use of the maritime domain by armed groups at their 
peril. To give but one example, al-Qaida operatives and affiliates 
attempted at least eighteen major attacks on or via the ocean between 
1998 and 2011. In addition to the attack on the USS Cole, these included 
attacks on private yachts, the delivery of explosives for the Tanzania and 
Kenya embassy bombings in 1998, a successful attack on the French oil 
tanker Limburg in 2002 near Yemen, and attacks on oil tankers off the 
coast of Iraq in 2004.36 Given the advantages of surprise and deception 
that using the maritime domain confers, it is less surprising that LeT used 
the ocean for the Mumbai attacks and more a question of which other 
armed groups might follow suit.
The 2008 Mumbai attacks also serve as an important reminder of how 
armed groups and states can exploit intangible seams and gaps such as 
diplomatic tensions between states to their advantage. In the case of 
Mumbai, the attacks seemed intended to further exacerbate tensions 
between Indian and Pakistan, and between India's Muslim and Hindu 
populations. LeT's attacks in Kashmir against Indian troops are well 
known, and many observers consider LeT to be acting with the support—
either concrete or tacit—of Pakistani intelligence officers.37 This raised 
the stakes for both India and Pakistan during the 2008 attacks and ele-
vated the risk of an event with regional consequences. Indeed, given this 
context and the very public nature of the attacks, the diplomatic and mili-
tary restraint both states showed during the attacks and in the aftermath 
was probably a bitter disappointment to LeT and its supporters. However, 
the attacks also raise the issue of how an armed group can exploit its tacti-
cal success to escalate strategic tensions. Had India been less restrained 
in its reaction to the shocking and prolonged siege in Mumbai, it is con-
ceivable that LeT might very well have provoked another deep-freeze in 
relations between Indian and Pakistan, or even another hot war in the 
Kashmir region.
The ability of armed groups to affect local, regional, and even interna-
tional security is not limited to LeT and is certainly not limited to India-
Pakistan relations. In 2006, for example, Israel's reaction to Hezbollah's 
kidnapping of Israeli Defense Force officers quickly escalated into a hot 
conflict across the Israeli-Lebanese border. Moreover, when the cross-
border shelling had subsided, Hezbollah took advantage of the destruc-
tion caused by Israeli rockets in order to further extend its networks of 
power and patronage in Southern Lebanon. The conflict also undermined 
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the Lebanese government's legitimacy and authority and raised serious 
doubts about its ability to hold onto power.38 The timing of the 2008 
Mumbai attacks was unfortunate from a U.S. perspective, given the deli-
cate diplomatic negotiations between the United States and Pakistan to 
put pressure on Afghan Taliban and al-Qaida leadership thought to be 
hiding in the Federally Administrated Tribal Area (FATA) region of Paki-
stan. The attacks were intended to divert Pakistani attention on the new 
tensions with India, as well as to its own troops in the Kashmir region, 
leaving little spare energy to support U.S. adventures in FATA.39
Finally, despite this seemingly dire assessment of how non-state armed 
groups use the environment to their advantage and exploit seams and 
gaps, there is reason to be hopeful. States do prevail against armed groups 
on a regular basis, and attacks such as Mumbai are memorable in part for 
their rarity. For example, the Sri Lankan government successfully dis-
rupted and defeated the Tamil Tigers, who were extremely adept at 
exploiting seams. In addition to transforming their own navy to cover 
maritime gaps, the Sri Lankan government was able to disrupt and 
degrade the fundraising activities of the LTTE among the Tamil diaspora 
in Canada, UK, and India.40 Unfortunately, these cases point to the reality 
that a lot of time, blood, treasure, and political capital are typically 
expended before states learn which seams and gaps armed groups are tak-
ing advantage of and how to close those gaps.
Conclusion
In conclusion, this article used the example of the 2008 Mumbai attacks 
carried out by LeT to analyze how armed groups can use the maritime 
domain as a conduit for clandestine attacks. The case also illustrates how 
an armed group can exploit four different types of seams: environmental 
and geographical; institutional; cognitive; and alliances and coalitions.
•   The environmental and geographic factors included Mumbai's 
geographical position as a bustling coastal city with crowded coastal 
waters.
•   The institutional factors included institutional inertia, entrenched 
bureaucratic interests, standard operating procedures and routines 
that resulted in interoperability, blind spots, and limited habits of 
cooperation between maritime agencies, legal authorities, and 
jurisdictions.
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•   The cognitive factors included the failure to recognize that the LeT 
and other armed groups use the Indian Ocean to move goods, people, 
weapons, and money, and that attacking Mumbai from the sea, 
whether through an amphibious landing or small boats laden with 
explosives, was well within their imagination.
•   The diplomatic and alliance factors included the tensions 
between states—India and Pakistan—and the strain the attacks placed 
on the U.S.-Pakistan partnership. The LeT was able to exploit existing 
diplomatic tensions, geographic boundaries, and political rivalries to 
leverage blind spots and amplify operational and strategic effects.41
As noted in the introduction, although this single example of the 2008 
attacks in Mumbai does not provide an exhaustive list of how all armed 
groups can use the environment to their favor and of all the seams and 
gaps they can possibly exploit, this article is intended to provide a jump-
ing-off point for further research, analysis, and debate on some of the 
most pressing issues facing states today; such as, where and how to focus 
scarce resources in order to close seams and hopefully exploit gaps 
against innovation and surprise by armed groups.
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